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Comment on Curr ent Issues

How Do You Tell a Student from an Apple?
The contemporary British philosopher J. 0 . Urmson
illustrates the notion of grading in a manner more akin
to Johnson (Samuel) than to Webster (Noah). Urmson
says :
If you have an apple tree you know very well that
all the apples will not be worth eating and that in a
normal season there will be more apples on the tree
which are fit for eating than you can eat immediately upon ripening. Therefore, when you gather your
crop, you will probably divide it into three lots the really good apples, the not-so-good but edible,
and the throw-outs . The good ones you will store
(or perhaps sell some at a high price), the not-sogood you will use at once (and perhaps sell some at
a lower price), the throw-outs you will throw out,
or give to your pigs, or sell at a very low price for
someone else's pigs. Let us call this process by the
name which, in more complicated forms, it bears in
the packing sheds of commercial growers -grading. Let us call gradt.ng labels the adjectives which
we apply to the different grades as names of those
grades - good, bad, indifferent; first-rate, secondrate, third-rate; high-quality, medium quality, low
quality; and so on.

The grading of apples is not, however, always as
simple as Urmson says it is. The apples, after all, were
grown on your tree, and you may very well have developed a special affection for each one of them . If you
have, you may find it difficult to classify any of your
apples as throw-outs. You might think that there is at
least a little good in each apple, even though you may
not be willing to put each of your apples in a barrel with
any other of your apples . On the other hand , you may
begin to worry about your pigs, to whom (we may suppose) you are at least as attached as you are to your
apples. If there are no throw-out apples, your pigs will
go hungry. You may, in consequence, decide to throw
out (to your pigs) even some apples which, if you didn't
have the pigs, you might choose to eat yourself. Such are
the complications which often arise when you choose to
both grow apples and to raise pigs.
Commercial packing houses, on the other hand, are
spared all such difficulties. They do not raise pigs; they
just sort and pack apples. Their grading of applies is ,
accordingly, less troubling for their emotions. But beFebruary, 1971

side this obvious advantage, commercial packing houses
are spared the agony of setting their own standards for
the sorting of apples. The government does it for them.
The government thoughtfully provides "definitions of
quality" for apples, and carefully instructs packinghouses as to the size, complexion, ripeness, etc. of apples
of the various standard quality categories. All the packing-house need do is gear up its machinery to sort the
apples in accordance with the rigid governmental
guidelines.
Does something of the same situation obtain with
respect to the grading of students? Or is the grading of
students very unlike the grading of apples? How, in
fact, do you tell a student from an apple?
It is tempting to suppose that the grading of students
is an institutionalized practice - much like the packing
house's grading of apples. The academic institution sets
the policy for grading of students, just as the government sets the policy for the grading of apples. The catalog of my university, for example, sets the quality categories as follows:
A . Excellent; valued at three (3) quality points for
each credit.
B. Good; valued at two (2) quality points for each
credit.
C. Satisfactory; valued at one (1) quality point for
each credit.
D . Less than satisfactory; indicates some deficiency
and gives no quality points, but gives credit for
graduation.
F. Failure; valued at 0 credits and 0 quality points.
All an instructor need do, on this view, in order to grade
his students fairly is to look and see whether their work
is excellent, good, satisfactory, less than satisfactory, or
very much less than satisfactory. By their works ye shall
know them; and further, ye shall know the quality of
their work just by looking at it.
What this institutional-intuitive approach to grading
ignores is that terms such as "excellent," "good," and
"satisfactory" are not themselves criteria-terms. They
are, rather, designations of worth with respect to some
criteria or other. What these criteria are is another
matter - and, I am suggesting, a matter which can quite
properly be disputed .
When the government instructs packing-houses in
the sorting of apples, it does not tell these companies to
sort apples according to their relative goodness. It tells
them to sort apples according to their size, ripeness,
3

color, and the like, further instructing them on what
size, color, etc. apples are to constitute one of the quality-categories of apples. Academic institutions typically
do no such thing. They provide the designations of
worth - c.f. Extra Fancy, Fancy, Commercial - but
leave up to the instructor the criteria by which these
general designations are to be applied. Thus the instructor's situation in grading is much more analogous to the
farmer who does his own crude sorting of apples (for
sale, for eating, and for his pigs) than it is analogous to
commercial packing houses which sort apples according
to precisely established criteria.
The analogy between the instructor in grading and
the farmer deciding what to do with his apples is, however, only partially convincing. The analogy holds, I
think, insofar as the instructor is grading for strictly
evaluative purposes. Grading for evaluative purposes
typically occurs during the course of the learning period - the quarter, the semester, or the length of time an
instructor is associated with a student. Viewed in this
light, grades are often very economical ways of communicating to a student just what you think of his
written or oral work.
I have recently experimented with writing only comments - substantive, stylistic, even personal, but usually fairly extensive comments - on student papers, without appending to my comments a grade on the papers.
I cannot yet say whether, on balance, this pedagogical
device will have been helpful or counterproductive. If
there was a problem with it, the problem doubtless lies
in the student's tendency to read my critical remarks as
being more condemnatory than I intended them to be,
and my favorable remarks as being less encouraging
than I intended them to be. (What this says about the
general insecurity of students in our present educational structures is hard to determine.) In any case, adding
grades to the papers would probably have softened,
rather than intensified, the blow experienced by many
students upon receiving their evaluated work, largely
because students tend to think (probably from reading
the catalog) that they know what the grades "mean",
whereas they often confess that they do not know what
my comments, however extensive, "mean" - in terms,
of course, of grades.
When, however, grades are used not for evaluative
purposes, but rather for ranking purposes, a subtle yet
4

crucial shift of standards occurs. "Excellent" work by
an average student may very well be qualitatively identical to "Less Than Satisfactory" work by a highly gifted
student. When one ranks the two students, however,
the rank (on the basis of that particular piece of work)
must be the same, for there is no qualitative difference
between the work. Yet when grades given during the
semester for evaluative purposes are (usually fairly
mechanically) translated into a final grade which, on
the transcript, is usually taken as a ranking designation,
an obvious problem arises. The criteria for evaluation
and the criteria for ranking are largely separable,
though uniform 'B's' throughout a semester are rarely
summarized in an 'A' or an 'F' for the course as a whole.
The disanalogy between the farmer and the instructor therefore is rooted in the fact that the farmer with
his apples and pigs serves a purely private function in
his sorting of apples; he makes his allocations according
to his perceptions of his own interests. The instructor,
on the other hand, operates both in a private and in the
public domain. He is trying to give to his students those
evaluations which will be most helpful to them in their
personal and academic lives. He is also charged by his
institution with the duty to sort out his students accord. ing to other criteria. To suppose that any very simple
ralation obtains between grades given for these two
different purposes is, as I have tried to suggest, very
questionable.
Consider, finally, the difficulty faced by the instructor as he attempts to discharge his public or institutional
responsibility of ranking his students. I have already
noted that far from supplying our beleagured instructor
with serviceable criteria for final ranking, most institutions at best provide him with the labels those (missing)
criteria are supposed to explicate. But worse: The instructor is asked to rank his students in near total ignorance of the relevant group within which the ranking
presumably takes place.
The relevant group can hardly be the students registered for his particular course. What, after all, is the
likelihood that the students registered for an instructor's course in a given semester constitute a "normal
sample" (Whatever that would be) of the students where? around the country? in this University? in this
sort of University? - in - what? any course? a course
in this discipline? a course at this level?
Most instructors are, of course, sensitive to such difficulties as these, and few of them (I would hope) are
slavishly obedient to the "normal curve" in their final
grading. But if adherence to the normal curve is clearly
questionable, so is departure from it. For in what direction shall one depart from it, and with what justification? The most one typically has to go on in making
these decisions is a gut-feeling, an intuition, a supposition. Extensive experience in teaching may go some
distance toward purifying such intuitions, though of
course it is just as possible that an instructor be consistently mistaken in his estimate of the relative ranking
The Cresset

ing those shortcomings.
Still, I am realistic enough to know that no amount of
railing against non-evaluative ranking of students is
likely to change the well-established grading practices
of the academic community. My argument, therefore, is
directed mainly to that solitary soul confronted with
the need to tote up the results at the end of each semester: the instructor.

desserts of his students. Inquiry into the practices of his
colleagues may help some, too ; yet there is slim assurance that two men lost in a forest will find their way out
simply by joining forces.
It may be thought that the problem is not all that serious; after all, there are lots of checks and balances in
a student's academic career, and people who read transcripts develop a certain knack for discovering where,
even in a maze of contradictions, the truth lies. Yet once
again; the fact that there are features of the "system"
which serve to mitigate its most grevious shortcomings
hardly constitutes an argument in support of continu-

What I have argued is that the grading of students
is much more difficult than the grading of apples; this
difference alone enables you to tell a student from an
apple. The grading of students is more difficult precisely because we lack institutional criteria for the institutional labels we must use; because our main purpose in grading throughout a course is quite different
from the purposes we must serve in grading at the end
of a course; and because even within a course grades
may signify a variety of different estimates of worth. At
the moment the most I can do toward solving these difficulties is merely to identify them, and perhaps also to
appeal to my colleagues to be as sensitive as they can to
the difficulties we all face in grading. That is not much;
it is certainly not enough. But perhaps it is something.

On Second Thought
Forgiveness is not an easy concept for men . It cannot
be taught by words about it. As an abstract it means
nothing. It must be exampled, we need a model to watch.
A high proportion of the trouble in the world would be
alleviated if our growing kids had better models of
forgiveness than we adults can provide.
A good number of homes have such a model, but few
realize it or utilize it. The model is the family dog. You
can beat it, and it will forgive you. You can punish it
for something it did not know was wrong, and it will
forgive. You can treat it harshly, forget to feed it, restrict its play, compel it to perform tricks - and it will
forgive you all the things you do.
It does not recognize any abstract difference between
the good things you do and the wrong things you do.
It can forgive them both alike, and treat you with the
same joy and acceptance in each. Forgiveness is not
something special for a dog, a meritorious act that it
must work at. Forgiveness is the normal pattern, lived
without effort. Forgiveness is the natural response to
everything you do.
The dog owner does not have to worry about being
bawled out by his dog. He knows that there will be approval and joy to greet him when he gets horne, no
matter what the leave-taking was like. Even if he returns
horne sour and discouraged by his day, the dog will be
unaffected. It will come forward with happiness, a greeting unalloyed with anxiety, the very heart of forgiveness.
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By ROBERT J. HOYER

The family dog knows the relationship between forgiveness and love, between forgiving and being forgiven. It knows that you do not earn forgiveness or
deserve it. A dog is never ashamed to ask for love, because it is never ashamed to give love. It does not ask
for forgiveness, it takes that for granted in the giving
and taking of love. It will sometimes cower in fear of
its owner's anger, but it knows that the anger has nothing to do with the forgiveness it will offer and eventually take.
A dog knows that you don't have to be good yourself before you can forgive. It can cheerfully make all
sorts of blunders, do all sorts of wrongs, and yet quite
simply forgive and be forgiven. For a dog, forgiveness
is not tied to a balance of right and wrong. It is a way
of life in love.
There are exceptions, of course. A dog owner may
harden his heart against the forgiveness of his dog. His
treatment may be so unremittingly harsh that he finally rejects the dog. He may find then that his dog can
withdraw love, regard its master with fear and hate,
and deliberately add to the hardening of its master's
heart. Or the dog owner may so pamper the dog, or treat
it with such studied indifference to love and the dog's
forgiveness , that the dog's capacity to forgive is atrophied and the relationship destroyed.
There is a model of forgiveness. Like all models short
of our Lord Jesus, it is a faulty model. But it is there.
Accept the forgiveness of your dog, and learn from it.
5

An Examination of Examinations
By CYNTHIA FANSLER BEHRMAN
Associate Professor of History
Wittenberg University
Springfield, Ohio

Too few in the college teaching profession have given
enough serious thought to precisely what is the purpose
of an examination and what are the best means of accomplishing that purpose.
There are roughly three functions of an examination
in an average college subject. First, an exam is a way for
the teacher to find out how the students have absorbed
the material he thinks necessary to the course. Put another way, an exam is a test of the teacher's teaching,
but probably very few college instructors take this particular function with any great seriousness. How many of
us for example, say "My, I must have given a terrible
lecture on Romanticism, since only two per cent of the
class answered the question on Romanticism with any
real understanding." No, we are far more likely to say,
"What a stupid class I got this time. They cannot even
grasp the fundamentals of a very simple lecture." Or,
"What a lazy class I have; they're too interested in the
football games to put their minds to studying for this
exam."
The second function of an examination is to assign
the student a standing in the ranks of his fellows . We
present a body of material - e.g. English History from
1714 to the Present. In the third of the allotted semester's time we expect the students to have learned a third
of the allotted material. Accordingly, we give them a
test to find out how they have, in fact , learned this. Then
because we assume that by no means all of an average
class will learn all of the material , we assign an arbitrary
scale. If a student knows ninety per cent of what we wish
him to know, he gets a ninety, or, arbitrarily, an "A",
eighty per cent a "B", and so on.
But does this not really defeat the purpose of learning? Why should we be content that ten per cent of our
class knows ninety per cent of the material? Why should
not the goal in education, in all good teaching, be that
one hundred per cent of the class knows one hundred
per cent of the material? However, if we gave a test to a
group of average undergraduates, all of whom wrote
what we would consider an "A" exam, we would be
astonished; we would think there was something wrong
with the exam ("it was too easy") , and we would probably revise upwards our notion of an "A" answer. But
rather should we not think of this result as a compliment
to our good teaching and to their inspiration to learning? If perfection equals one hundred per cent, why
then strive for a mere sixty per cent? Why should this
not be Unsatisfactory?
By deciding that all students in a college must be
sorted out according to some scale
a normal curve,
6

j

some people call it - we have arbitrarily limited them
by refusing to allow more than approximately ten per
cent to "succeed" and to know one hundred per cent of
the material. This, it seems to me, defeats the whole
purpose of education, suggesting as it does, that half
right or three-quarters right is "good enough."
And yet this is not the way learning is carried on in
the earlier years in our educational system. We never
suggest that a child in first grade should learn only half
or three-quarters of the alphabet or the multiplication
tables. No, we set up instead a minimum quantative
standard of achievement, and then we insist that children reach that standard. And by and large they do
achieve this. Why could we not apply a similar principle
in college?
The third function of exams is one almost totally unrecognized by the majority of the college teaching profession, I would suspect. An exam is a learning tool. The
very process of preparing for and writing an exam helps
the student to organize and learn the material. To some
extent, this function, the pedagogical function, is in
conflict with the other two functions mentioned, particularly the second.
If, for example, you have a class of one hundred students and the registrar is breathing down your neck for
the semester's grades, you are inclined to design an exam
which will be easy to correct. Easy and quick. In history,
for example, we may resort to the so-called "objective
exam": the testing of recall of specific factual material,
rather than asking the student to use the facts in the substance of an answer to an interpretive question. And why
does one do this? Not because any historian or teacher
worth his salt pretends that the dates of the battles and
the names of the kings are more important than their
meaning, but rather because this type of exam will produce quantifiable results in the shortest possible time.
Thus, we have accomplished the second objective the ranking of students - but not the third, which is
surely the more important. Furthermore, the assignment of rank automatically dooms (or "permits") a large
fraction of the class to do less than their best, in order
that the requirements of "normal distribution" may be
met. Therefore, the exam which best sorts out students
into identifiable rank (according to our second function)
then will do a poor job of helping all students to learn
the material of the course.
To some extent, these competing roles of the examination process are present in all types of tests: The "objective" as well as the "essay." But even with the former,
there are serious inherent faults - particularly since
The Cresset
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they do not accurately provide the quantitative results
on which teachers base their students' grades.
Let us look at some of the types of exams and see how
in fact they fail even to fulfill their secondary purpose
of providing a scale of students.

When Examinations Fail the Test

~,

1. True-False. Although widely used, this type of exam
is falling into dususe. Probably more people now than
formerly recognize its inherent faults: A statement may
be either partially true or partially false. A statement
may be partially true or all true in some contexts and not
in others. A statement may be falsified by the use of an
adverb. ("The French always feared the British Navy."
Well, always? Every single Frenchman?) In other words,
a true-false exam sets up an arbitrary line, an arbitrary
duality of information, which is false to the very nature
of the subject, frequently.
Furthermore, there are some secondary reasons why
true-false is undesirable. Any question offers a fiftyfifty chance of getting the correct answer; a student
should be able to do more than recognize a correct answer. Furthermore, a true-false exam "reinforces," to
use the psychologist's term, incorrect information. The
very fact of having a written statement before one's eyes
tends, subconsciously, to reinforce it in the student's
mind. But if a teacher is playing fair with his students
and has a reasonable fraction of false statements, the
student will nevertheless read these statements with an
open mind, assuming them to be either true or false.
The possibility of their falsehood is just as good as their
possibility of truth. Even if he guesses correctly or in
fact knows the right answer, the chances of this reinforcement of incorrect information will be very large and of
course undesirable. The instructor has no way of knowing how many of the answers the student knows positively and how many he has accurately guessed.
2. Multiple choice. Multiple choice is another kind of
objective test, perhaps the most common of recent years
due, no doubt, largely to the battery of Educational
Testing Service exams to which the student is subjected
in his life. A statement is made, a question is asked, and
four or five choices for the correct answer are given.
Now what are the structural possibilities here? The implication of the multiple choice is that one is correct and
four are incorrect. As it is sometimes phrased on the
exam, "choose the answer which best describes . . ." But
surely, particularly in a subject like history, "best describes" is largely a matter of interpretation.
True, certain facts may be tested by the multiple
choice exam. For example, "Which of the following countries was not a member of the Holy Alliance?" But how
would you get the student to think about the significance of alliance systems in Western history? It is virtually impossible. Further, the teacher must supply
choices which have an equal chance of being correct; he
must also be able to predict the incorrect choices a stuFebruary, 1971

dent might choose. Very few teachers are wholly successful at this.
If the teacher is not equally successful at supplying
choices with each and every question, what happens to
his myth of "objectivity"? For if each question counts
ten points, but question #4 is less "good" (as previously defined) than question #5, the student who loses ten
points on #4 really does not have the same, equivalent
score to someone who missed #5. What the teacher has
accomplished, therefore, is a batch of scores which have
only an approximate, not a precise, relationship to
ability or knowledge. The same criticism applies to
other types of short-answer tests - matching, blank-filling, and others.
I do not wish to suggest that multiple choice can never be successful in eliciting certain types of information, or in asking students to think along certain prescribed lines. There are, for examples, variations on the
familiar model which avoid some of the pitfalls mentioned. One can, for instance, ask students to check
more than one choice. All of the choices given, perhaps,
might be "correct."• Nevertheless, I think, the basic criticism holds - that essentially this kind of exam is passive: students are asked to recognize and organize factual
material (not an unimportant process), but they are not
expected to construct, express, and defend an interpretation of that material for themselves.
It would be foolish to say that the short-answer test
has no place in an educational system. But what is also
foolish, I think, is to suppose that it can accomplish the
impossible: namely, the objective quantification of
students' abilities. To the extent that we ask it to do
this, we seriously short-change ourselves and the student.
3. Essay. What of the essay exam? Most instructors in
the fields of the social sciences or the humanities now
concede that the essay exam is preferable for the testing
of that kind of thinking which they hope is taught in
their courses. To use our previous example: "Were the
members of the Holy Alliance successful in achieving
their goals?" requires the student not only to know who
these members were (and , equally important, what nations were not members), but also what the aims of the
Alliance were, how later events led to its extinction,
and hopefully, too , what are the potential weaknesses
and strengths of any alliance system. In short, an essay
question ( a good one) should ask the student to use his
knowledge of the details of the past to form some conclusions about the meaning of the past, and of the present.
Although it is customary to think of the essay question as more useful to these fields than to the natural
sciences, I think it has a place here, too. The aim of
these fields is not dissimilar from the goals of history
*That there has been considerable sophistication in the preparation
of such tests may be indicated by several booklets published by the
Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey , e.g., "Multiple
Choice Questions: A Close Look" (1963) , "ETS Builds a Test" (1959),
and "Making the Classroom Test: a Guide for Teach~rs , " (1959).
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or literature, after all. An instructor might ask a student to construct a possible laboratory procedure which
would enable him to identify a certain chemical compound. Such a question would ask of him not only the
"passive" knowledge of compounds and their typical
behavior, but also some familiarity with the epistemology
of science.
All right, then, where is the difficulty? The trouble
comes with our second function: quantification of students. Everyone is familiar (students only too bitterly
so) with the essay which gets a good grade because it
sounds smooth and thoughtful although it is relatively
unsupported with details. Contrast it with a halting,
limp, ungrammatical, misspelt, and often smudged
monstrosity which is full of facts and figures, laboriously
learned. How does the instructor rank these two? That
which seemed convincing and profound early in the day
may look banal by the end of a long evening's grading
of Western Civilization finals.
And how does one give grades for answers to questions like "Discuss the causes of the First World War"?
Unfortunately, there is no handy "profundity scale"
by which we can conveniently measure the essay. In
short, there is no accurate way to ensure that any exam
even achieves the least important of its functions accurate scaling of students. And by assuming an objective quantifiability which does not, in fact, · exist, both
students and instructors are seriously misled about the
nature and purpose of education. It is at this point that
the grading system interferes.

Carrots, Sticks, and Gold Nuggets
Grades function in two particular, sometimes competing, ways: as motivation and as reward.
1. Motivation. If a student receives a grade which disappoints him in some way, either because he feels it is
undeserved or because he feels dissatisfied with his own
performance, he is usually stimulated to do better. However, there are occasions with which all teachers are
familiar where a student receives a grade which is so
much below his expectations that he is totally discouraged from doing any better. In such a situation that
grade is unequivocally the wrong one; no teacher wishes
his student to give up all effort. But the system can work
both ways. Assume a student gets a grade which is higher than his expectations. There are usually two results
of such a situation: one, the student is stimulated to do
better to reach the level of the grade he was given or,
two, he is tempted to slack off since his expectations of
the difficulty of the material have been unfulfilled.
The two points above suggest that the teacher must
use grades very shrewdly; he must know his students
and must be aware to what extent and in what precise
ways each of them is being motivated by a particular
grade. When the class size rises above a very small number, say fifteen, it is virtually impossible for a teacher
to know each student in such intimate fashion.
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2.Reward. One of the less pleasant aspects of the educational system is its built-in expectation of a system of
rewards and punishments. Because a grade can be just
as much a punishment as it is a reward, the student
feels that he is entitled to a certain level of reward commensurate with his performance in the class. Conversely, the teacher feels entitled to withhold this reward if
he feels that the student is not doing his best, for whatever reason. The trouble with such a system is that it
sets up a competitive position between teacher and
student, such that they appear to be on opposite sides
of an educational goal. That is, the teacher tries to make
things as hard as possible for the stud~nt, and the student tries to "psych out" the teacher so as to do as little
as possible for the goal that he expects and hopes for.
Many teachers, for example, behave as though "A's"
were gold nuggets of which they had only a finite quantity in .their pockets to be doled out very meagerly and
with a parsimonious hand. When the supply is gone
there would be no more "A's" for the students to receive. Partly this attitude is a function of the teacher's
own insecurity with his profession. He uses the highness
of his standards for his students as a measure of his own
teaching ability. And how is this standard measured?
By how few students can pass his course! But if we look
at this attitude another way it is surely no compliment
at all to his abilities for him to say, in effect, "See how
good I am ; only three per cent of my class can pass." We
might reply, "If you are such a terrible teacher that your
class cannot possibly understand what you are talking
about, why boast of this?"
Would it not be possible to establish a system in which
the teacher, without sacrificing his high standards for
performance, helps all his students to reach these high
standards, where he is in fact a pedagogue and not a
competitor. Later I shall suggest ways in which this
might be accomplished.
Is there any advantage to a situation in which the student receives a grade but is not informed of this grade it is recorded in some remote spot, for other purposes,
perhaps? Students with whom I have discussed this plan
are unanimously opposed to it. They like to know "where
they stand." And to some extent they welcome competing with their neighbors; secret grades would not
permit open competition. They also feel that they are
entitled to (and have paid for!) critical , expert evaluation of their work, and they equate - as we all do, unfortunately -evaluation with grade received .
One term I tried a grade-motivation experiment with
a freshman honors section. It was announced at the outset that each student would be guaranteed the top grade.
We then proceeded with the course on the assumption
that the students would , as they promised implicitly,
do their best simply because they enjoyed the work that
they were doing. At the end of the term I discussed the
results of the system with the students. Most of them
confessed that they had not, in fact, worked up to the
limit of their capacity. Some students felt guilty about

The Cresset

this, though by no means all of them did. Some students
privately expressed to me the wish that they had had
enough self-discipline to do their best for me (the phrase
there is significant, I think) and felt guilty at having
failed to do this. They thought that they were not entitled to the grade that they had received. It might have
been interesting to repeat the experiment a second time
with the same group to compare the results, but they
went on to more conventional courses.

Pass-Fail, and a Longing Glance at Excellence
Many institutions are experimenting with some form
of the "pass-fail" system. Basically, this is a device which
eliminates grades in the traditional sense of a graduated
scale of rewards related to achievement in favor of a
system which simply describes students as having successfully or unsuccessfully completed a course. Unfortunately, this system (which has much to recommend it)
is usually sabotaged by combining it with the traditional
forms.
For example, with the idea of easing the adjustment
to academic life, a college may institute the pass-fail
for freshmen, but, with a longing glance at the idea of
rewarding excellence, it may compromise by having H
(honors), S (satisfactory) and F (fail). What, then, is this
but simply a widening of the boundaries of the former
categories? Instead of A-B-C-D-F you have, essentially,
A,B-through-D,F, disguised by different terms. Aside
from easing the instructor's burden (he has only two
borderlines to agonize over instead of the usual four),
of what value is this to the student? Students have told
me that it encourages slacking-off in the vast middle
range, while not adding any more encouragement and
stimulation to the top student than an A previously did.
Some universities have tried to integrate pass-fail
with their usual system by allowing it as an option for a
prescribed maximum number of courses, usually outside the student's major. But this practice then runs into the difficulty for the instructor of having two different (and competing) systems of evaluation within
the same course, to say nothing of the difficulty of competing systems of motivation. It may not be impossible
to achieve the basic goals of pass-fail , but I seriously
doubt whether it is either possible or pedagogically desirable to combine different systems of grading within
one institution.
Are there any solutions to this double problem of
exams and grades? Yes, I think there are several possible avenues. First, the instructor's teaching load should
be low enough that he can know all of his students well
enough to help them individually with their own problems of motivation and response .
Secondly, he should acknowledge to himself that all
grades are arbitrary, and, having done so, plan to use
them optimally to assist rather than hinder the educational process. This will mean deliberately , and publically, departing from the sacred "curve" which dooms
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the class to a predetermined top, bottom, and middle.
(He must be pleased, not dismayed, when half the class
gets an "A"!) I am not forgetting that the "curve" is a
useful device for the instructor in assessing the quality
of his own work, both in the lecture and in the actual
composition of the exam. He can tell from the general
"fall" of the responses whether the exam was too difficult or not challenging enough. But this function of a
"curve" need not mean that the spread is communicated
in precise terms to the students, too.
Thirdly, the instructor should insist on a high minimum standard of performance and quantity of information. We might, for example, use "objective" exams to
test the achievement of factual knowledge, but only as
the first step to ascertaining what use the student can
then make of the material. The student should be required to repeat or re-write those sections of the test
which he missed, so that all students will have the same
minimum quantity of information. If this task of repetition is insisted upon, it will be arduous enough and
involve enough extra work that he will be motivated to
put the required effort into the first trial. In other words,
to "pass" the course, all students must have mastered
the minimum information - all must get 100%. (The
threat of "failure" will probably be sufficient to provide the needed motivation.)
Further, students should not be allowed to assume
that an "average" answer (a "C" in the ordinary scale)
to an essay question is adequate, but should be expected
to rewrite the exam until it is in its best possible form.
Why should not an exam be treated in the same way as
is the first draft of a term paper? A student will often
carelessly look at the corrections and emendations of
his bluebook; since there is no possibility of changing
the outcome - the grade - he will only passively, if
at all, absorb the criticism.

Raising the C Level of Students
The process of rewriting the answer to strengthen its
weaknesses, to include relevant information which was
omitted, and to correct faults of diction and grammar
will reinforce the material in his mind; in short, he will
know it better. (To this end, I would suggest that the
grade be an arbitrary and unfamiliar one, e.g. 17 points
out of a possible 23, with 23 defined as "satisfactory."
If one uses the A,B ,C,D,F, scale, one runs the risk of
student's shrugging off a "C" grade as perfectly satisfactory to him. Or one could give no grades at all until
the exam is adequately written.)
The possibility - indeed the requirement - that all
work be rewritten as often as necessary will mean that
the surprise element is missing from exams. Well, why
not? It may be possible that a secret exam is a relic of
the competition between teacher and student, where students lived in terror of the awful, and unknown, questions on tomorrow's test. There will be no necessity to
hide the questions from the students. Indeed, there is
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often a positive value in having students discuss the
exam with the instructor in class in advance of the test
day, so that they may prepare better answers.
There may - certainly will - be objections from both
faculty and students to this procedure. It will mean a
tremendous amount of correcting work to be done, and
much additional personal counseling of students in
habits of study or writing. The students themselves may
object to the requirement that each one of them must
produce "good" work in order to pass the course; they
may avoid such a course as they would a plague. But it
will not be a permanent boycott, since with ordinary
motivational reflexes in order most students will respond to the prospect of a course where - with the instructor's friendly prodding and help - all will receive
A's and B's. (It should not be pretended that all students can do perfect work, or be equally profound in all
types of thinking. One could reserve A-pluses, perhaps,
as rewards for those who are brilliant beyond comparison with their fellows; in any case, those who ordinarily
can only pull a C out of a course would not object to
achieving a B).
A more serious complaint will be raised by the better-

than-average students, who will feel that it is "unfair"
to them, if their fellow students who are their intellectual inferiors can get the same grade as they do. The
only answer that could be made to them (and they will
not wholly like it) is that they in all probability will be
achieving the same grade with half the time spent, which
can then be lavished on other pursuits. A further comment that they should mind their own business will not
be well received, although it is virtually unanswerable .
If they do not like it, they can always enroll in Professor----'s course; he is a notoriously hard grader.
As to the faculty's objection, it is the more difficult to
get around. However, it may be possible to do more towards these goals than it seems at first glance, simply
by altering our ideas of what is essential to teach. Do
we really care, for example, that a student ten or twenty
years hence remember who caused the French Revolution, or would it be better that he still be able to look at
a body of historical data and draw some intelligent
conclusions about them? Perhaps we have been putting
too much emphasis (and time) on quantity of material,
and too little on the development of a quality of mature
thinking which really enriches his education.

The Waiting in 11 Waiting for Godot"
By WILLIAM V. DAVIS
Wethersfield, Connecticut

Samuel Beckett's play, Waiting for Godot, has elicited
an almost frightful amount of critical commentary much of which is pedestrian or wrong-headed or boring,
or all three . No small portion of this commentary has
concerned itself with attempting to elucidate the meaning or significance of the word Godot. Godot has been
called God, death, the self, a distant mirage, "The meaning of life," silence and any number of other things.
One of the few critics (and it seems significant that he
is also, and primarily, a writer and not a critic by profession) who has talked meaningfully about Godot is
Alain Robbe-Grillet, who says succinctly, "Godot is that
character for whom two tramps are waiting at the edge
of a road, and who does not come."1 And that is, after
all, all that can be said about who or what Godot is and it is all that should be said about him or it. As
Beckett's character Molloy says, in the novel of the same
name, "There could be no things but nameless things,
no names but thingless names ... .All I know is what the
words know. ''2
If it is possible then, to put aside the question of
Godot, we might glance at the seemingly more significant word of the title of Beckett's play. This is the word
waiting. The only significant action or inaction that
takes place in the play itself is that of waiting.
Estragon and Vladimir, the two chief characters in
the play, find themselves in the typically existential
predicament which Beckett creates over and over again
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in his writings. They are convinced of their imminent
end and yet they find themselves incapable of doing
anything about the doom they sense will soon befall
them, if it has not already befallen them, and which will
ultimately destroy them. Indeed, all of Beckett's characters, in both his novels and his stories and plays, are
in similar positions to the one that Estragon and Vladimir find themselves in. They, along with Molloy, Malone, Worm, and Clov, are trapped in the midst of a
present that is confusing, unknown, and seemingly unknowable. All they can do is wait.
And wait they do -without any real hope and in the
knowledge that all activity and all desire is futile . They
have simply to endure, and, along the way, amuse themselves with games, delusions and dreams. They expect
the impossible possibility of some sort of salvation even
while they know that it will never come. Their lives are
as meaningless, to all appearances, as they expect their
deaths will be. And therefore, their existences are passed
by simply waiting for the inevitable to take place.
Beckett's characters live with the fear of imminent
disaster or destruction, or both. And so they wait, suspended in space and time, in the fear of the unknown
and in the greater fear of the knowledge of the unknown . At base, Waiting for Godot, like all of Beckett's
work, is a study in ontology.
And because Beckett's characters are trapped and
static in their endurance, their waiting, many critics of
The Cressct

his work have considered his dominant theme to be a
pessimistic one. They tend to view his novels, stories
and plays as catalogues of alienation and purposelessness. Certainly, in a world such as the world Beckett
has created, there seems to be no possibility for salvation - in any conceivable sense - and not even the possibility for any resolution.
If it is conceived that the emphasis in the play should
be placed on waiting, and Gunther Anders says that
Beckett himself has indicated that it should be - "Beckett has told us that he is not so much concerned with
Godot, as with 'Waiting'.'".l - then the play poses the
ontological question in terms of a kind of secularized
eschatological moment (or movement). As Ihab Hassan
says, "Waiting for Godot . .. focuses on Being mirrored
in the inaction of waiting."4
In Waiting for Godot time has been suspended, space
is almost nonexistent and action is minimal. The play
opens with the words, "Nothing to be done ."5 The "action" of the play consists of inaction and, at the end of
the play, the only thing that has "happened" is that
Vladimir and Estragon have waited for something to
happen - something which supposedly will not ever
happen. It would seem that Beckett's theme might be a
variation on Descartes' well-known proposition, "I
think , therefore I am a thinking thing." Beckett's proposition could be stated, "I wait, therefore I am waiting
for something, or someone."
Given this argument, is it necessarily the case that
Beckett's theme is a pessimistic one? Perhaps not. Paul
Tillich, in a sermon on "Waiting" points in quite another direction. Tillich says,
Waiting means not having and having at the same
time. For we have not what we wait for; or, as the
apostle says, if we hope for what we do not see, we
then wait for it ... . Even in the most intimate communion among human beings, there is an element of
not having and not knowing, and of waiting . ... But,
although waiting is not having, it is also having. The
fact that we wait for something shows that in some
way we already possess it. Waiting anticipates that
which is not yet real.

If we wait in hope and patience, the power of that for
which we wait is already effective within us. He who
waits in an ultimate sense is not far from that for
which he waits. He who waits in absolute seriousness
is already grasped by that for which he waits. He who
waits in patience has already received the power of
that for which he waits. He who waits passionately is
already an active power himself, the greatest power
of transformation in personal and historical life. We
are stronger when we wait than when we possess.
When we possess God, we reduce Him to that small
thing we knew and grasped of Him; and we make it
an idol. Only in idol worship can one believe in the
possession of God .. ..

Let us not forget, however, that waiting is a tremendous tension. Waiting is not despair. It is the acceptance of our not having, in the power of that which
we already have. Our time is a time of waiting; waiting is its special destiny. And every time is a time of
waiting, waiting for the breaking in of eternity. All
time runs forward . All time, both in history and in
personal life; is expectation. Time itself is waiting,
waiting not for another time, but for that which is
eternal.6
Given these comments by Tillich, Beckett's work takes
on a new and different perspective and his theme becomes more hopeful. In light of Tillich's statement,
Waiting for Godot can be seen not as a negative commentary on contemporary existence, but as a realistic
portrayal of the dilemma of modern man - a dilemma
which incorporates the possibility of hope even in the
midst of despair.

FOOTNOTES
1. Alain Robbe·Grlllet. For a New Novel: Euaro on Fiction, translated by Richard
Howard (New York , Grove Press , 1965), p. 115.
2 . Samuel Beckett, Mollor (New York , Grave Press , 1955), p. 41 .
3 . Gunther Anders . " Being without Time : On Beckett's Play Waiting lor Godot,
Samuel Beckett: A Collection of Critical Euaro. edited by Martin Esslin
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentlce· Hall, Inc ., 1965). p. 144.
4 . lhob Hasson , The Literature of Silence: Henry Miller and Samuel Beckett

(New York , Alfred A. Knopf , 1967), p . 176 .
5 . Samuel Beckett. Waiting for Godot (New York , Grave Press, 1954), p. 7 .
6 . Paul Tlllich, The Shaking of the Foundation• (New York, Charles Scribner's
Sons , 1948-), pp . 149· 152 .

Marine S o n g - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - How many little fishes in the water!
How many scales on the little fish!
In the heart so much grief!
In grief so many tears!
The little joy that appears
Quickly vanishes unseen .
Even the wave rising and swelling
Never knows why it dies.

The greatest of joys
Are costlier and uncertain
White foam gleams brighter
From a distance than near.
In life only grief,
In grief, only anxiety.
Eyes of light in water,
Water of light in eyes.
MARIO de ANDRADE

Translated from the P9rtuguese by D. M. Pettine/la
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The Visual Arts

Concept Art
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B Y RICHARD H. W. BRAUER
I don't mind New York City . I just shut off my senses and visit the
Met on weekends.
Quoted by Jack Burnham

Recently I read an essay analyzing the design of the
new Episcopal cathedral, Christ the King, located near
Kalamazoo, Michigan. The essay described the astonishing extent to which the forms of the building were
determined by a desire to express religious doctrine
literally.
For instance, to express the concept "God in Man's
World" the building is shaped into a sculpured cube
containing circular elements. The ceiling is supported
by four pillars, one in each corner to signify the evangelists Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. In the center
of the ceiling, and directly over the altar (the altar is
supported by three legs representing the Trinity) is a
round skylight. It is a symbol of the Incarnation, "the
light of Christ coming into man's dark, evil word."
At noon the sun's rays reach the altar creating a perfect
pyramid from the base of the pillars to the skylight.
"Just like on a dollar bill, the eye of God is at the apex of
the pyramid."
Resurrection Garden, on the east side of the Cathedral has the exact dimensions of the Cathedral. The
garden has four trees in the same positions as the four
pillars. The interior of the building has square light
fixtures, each holding thirty-three light bulbs for the
thirty-three years of the life of Jesus, etc.
Apparently the guiding vision for forming the church
was not that of practical function, or structural realism,
or aesthetic formal order, or even emotional effects.
Instead, the primary inspiration was the desire to
express intellectualized religious ideas concretely. Such
Byzantine explicitness is a reminder that, though long
unpopular in modern art, the expression of intellectualized thought and concepts can be a major thrust of
a work of art.
If so, how then can one understand quality in concept
art - an art that so often seems contrived and visually
slight? Perhaps quality in concept art depends on
(1) the toughness and fruitfulness of the thoughts or
images it stimulates in the contemporary beholder's
imagination, (2) the degree to which the visual forms
are essential to the concept, and finally (3) the age-old
standard, the degree to which the work is formally,
aesthetically satisfying. Except for the Resurrection
Garden and its four trees, the symbols of dogmas in the
Cathedral are so removed from everyday life that they
seem esoteric and fruitless.
But interest in an art of ideas is growing. Since about
1967 an increasing number of artists have been working
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in a direction variously called process, information, or
concept art. To these artists the art world of galleries,
museums, critics, and wealthy patrons seems esoteric,
out of touch with the thinking and social realities of
life. Often the art world appears to them to be similar
to a religious cult, with its sacred objects of pure formal
visual order which are approached with hushed reverence in those holy temples, the museums. As a corrective, these artists began making "secularized" works,
works that could not easily be possessed and would exist
in or refer to non-art contexts. (My feeling is that underlying much of their efforts was their need to keep themselves aesthetically fresh and alert by changing their
limitations and points of view).
For instance, some artists used the elements of nature
(the earth, the air, a field of wheat) and the scale of
landscape as their medium. Others tried to enlarge their
awareness by investigating how raw, non-art materials
act when displaced by gravity and other forces (huge
sheets of felt are draped and sliced, great lead planes
are propped against each other). The "real time" processes of every-day life are focused upon, and in one way
or another employed (plant growth systems, postal systems, packaging systems are variously investigated and
used). Trips are taken, "souvenir" documents are collected, procedures are seriously followed as in a game
or a ritual where the repetitions and their stabilizing
reassurance count for as much or more than the objective achievements of the acts.
The results often are not art objects that can easily
be bought and sold, but are events in the environment.
The primary value, I suspect, belongs to the artist himself, and to those in the actual presence of the work.
But the documents, such as the photographs, the map,
the verbal comments can serve to trigger new imagery
and thought in the mind of the beholder, new awareness
of the constancy and inconstancy in the processes of
everyday life.
Fred Nagelbach's work here reproduced takes several directions. Each photograph summarizes a different
event. The mixed match of gloves (inside cover) documents a lighthearted, homely "mistake" that all of us
with little children experience and perhaps should
take time to enjoy and photograph for our family album.
The matter-of-fact verbal description Fred provides
for his tomato plant bed (cover) throws into contrast
the vitality of the natural process anticipated by the
imagination. The photograph in itself, however, is not
artless. Cropping and view are very carefully considered . The fencing, the stakes, the rope, the spaded
The Cresset

earth, the grass are closely composed as rhythms, balance, and contrasts.
The photograph of the four "body posits" is cropped
so that the casts are isolated and the impulse to complete the figures in the mind is heightened. I find this
piece most provocative. The "mind posits," however, are
curiously negative or at least one-sided.
John Ward's sketch for a handbill called "The Makingof a New World" is an effort to catch people unawares

with art. Engaging some of the modest, bumbling processes of nature and men, he has started a metaphor for
the "World." The work tends to be whimsical. Yet the
procedures are so elaborate and the length of time for
which the work is programmed is so long that serious
intent is evident and serious thought is invited. What
gives the work visual substance is the size and selfcontained shape and light modulating capacity of the
fiberglass shell. It gives this poetic metaphor a reality.

The pictures of my work are:
1.

2.
3.

Backyard work of fence, rope, sticks, dirt, grass, leaves
and nails.
(for the cover)
Performance piece:
Dissimilar gloves.
Four body posits: stand, walk, sit, lie.
Not pictured are
the mind posits: lie, cheat, steal.

COPY
Since Valparaiso I have:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Grown a beard, shaved, grown a beard, shaved, and grown a
beard again.
Married and gotten two children.
Gone to school for two years in Providence, Rhode Island.
Lived in Europe for one year.
Lived in Illinois for two
and a half years.
Taught in Chicago for two and a half years.
Agitated for sensible ergo radical causes.
Tended my garden and kept my garage clean.
Instructions:

1.
2.

I don't want my name to head my page nor to appear anywhere
on my page.
The art experience must cease to be the province
of an elite.
I want all of my pictures to appear with distinctly rounded
corners.
The ninety degree syndrome is inconsistent with
the human eye and television.

February,l971
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Kuni Nuechterlein
Kuni Nuechterlein graduated from Valparaiso University in 1968. She spent ten months in England in
independent study at Coventry Cathedral and Coventry College of Art, where the work shown here was
done. She is now a designer for Overlock Howe and
Company in Saint Louis.

SIEVE I. 1969 .

TRANSFER, 1968 .

Transfer is an attempt to express a concept by repeating
it several times in varied ways and piling these statements quite randomly onto the page. The theme of the
photograph is repeated in the diagram design behind
it and again in the title.
Sieve I and Sieve II were done at a time when I was
feeling very frustrated in my attempts to communicate
visually. In contrast to Transfer, they have no verbal
forethought or intent. Their meaning is entirely subjective and they represent a striving for honesty and
transparency.
14
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SIEVE II. 1969.
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The shell Cor the new world is a piece of fiberglass made in Valparaiso, Indiana.
It is in my ba·ck yard in St. Joe, Michigan where>
it has been collecting rain since August. I'm raking up the leaves
round the house, throwing them in with the rainwater.
It's my plan
to make, to recreate, a new southern hemisphere.
I'm going to have
a sign out by the garbage cans pointing over to it so that when people drive by, as they've been doing Cor months, wondering what this
thing is~ ••• now they're going to know. It contains leaves from the
back yard, a ' few of Brian's toys, and a couple of leaves from the
black walnut tree in the next yard. I'm not using the leaves from
under the picnic table. I think they are of inferior ~uality;
and besides, 'thei • re hard to get at. The doorway to tRe new worlcll
~ an old door h tched to our wire gate.

And, let's see, what e~se dad I have on my mind? Oh yes, the
sian, the arrow pointing o~ the ~world, ~ southern hemisphere,
!h! makin1 2! ~ ~ world will be patterned after the expresslane
sian in the Jewel store in Benton Harbor.
It is a dark forrest
areen with a white border; the letters are white with black outlines. It was obviously cut andl lettered. by an ama-t eur. It will
be put in the deed to the house that this thing is to remain; and
that every year until the southern heaisphere is completed it is to
be fille~ with leaves and, they're to be allowed to rot and Corm
new earth.

The bathroom scale: on the aide of the tree which contributed •oat
the formation of the southern hemisphere ia to indicate the problema that are weighins on the tree's mind aa it aita
here. It usually reada zero. The only time it ever goes up ia when
somebody puahea on it.
'Though I can imagine: that in a big atorm
that the aind aight blow in there hard enough to puah it up a few
ounces. I've noticed that by leaning on it myself I can puah it up
to seventy pounds. Since I put it up on the tree a couple of
•ontha aso in ita little protective housing the reading hasn't var&
ied of ita own accord more than two or three pounds either side of
the zero indication on the scale itself.
o~ the leaves to

~
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s
8
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Janie L. Shackel
Painting instructor at Chicago State College.
Painting exhibitions in Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois.
Art teacher of physically and mentally handicapped.
M .F.A., Northern Illinois University, 1969.
B.A., Valparaiso University, 1966.
In the past few years my style has changed drastically
from figures painted with bold, heavy swaths of paint to
figures painted very flatly with a tight, hard, crisp edge.
However, there is an over-all consistency to my work the concern for the humanness of man, his inner self,
and his relationships with others.

I don't paint figures, I paint people. I apply a personal symbolism through the positioning of the people on
the canvas (one person may be above another, etc.),
through color (cold, gaudy, violent, sensual, etc.), and
through dress (nude, clothed, etc.).
My canvases are large (5' x 4 1/2' to 6' x 4 1/2') because
the life size adds to the powerfulness of the people. The
paintings do lose impact when seen in black and white
because I use the emotional quality of color to heighten
and intensify their meanings. You will find no titles on
any of my works because a title would limit the range of
interpretations.

The Theatre

The Famous Invalid
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

The Famous Invalid is quite sick these days on and offBroadway. I know he will pull through again as he has
done before, but this time it is quite serious. I cannot
believe that no good plays are being written. They are
not being produced. Incredibly little is produced. The
only interesting plays that have opened this season so
far came from London, and I have reported on them
from across the Atlantic.
Is it the stock market, recession or depression that
makes angels fear to tread on Broadway? Or is it not
rather a general ennui and .disgust that has set in? The
old theatre is no longer doing the trick, and the new
theatre is lost in its Living-Theatre-routines without
finding a way into a liberating artistic form.
Neil Simon had the ambition of becoming a contemporary Moliere. He may have realized that he just barely achieved being something between a modern Labiche
and Feydeau. So he became serious with just enough
laughs to remind his audience of his real self. The Gingerbread Lady is a play about a nymphomaniac alcoholic. She is also as incurable in her honesty which is
self-destructive and in her weakness full of self-pity.
Nothing much happens in the play that we couldn't
guess without having seen it. The characters are cliches
and two-dimensional, feeding one another cues for
witty lines. The play is not serious enough to be really
funny and too superficially funny to be taken seriously.
It may run for a while because Maureen Stapleton is
marvellous in a juicy - I should have said - boozy part
and because Neil Simon wrote it.
Paul Sill's Storey Theatre is what it says. Well known
stories are retold on stage, mainly fairy tales. The telling is done by narrative recitation, a lot of pantomime,
a great deal of movement, some occasional acting and
clowning, and all punctuated and underlined by music.
The whole presentation has an air of improvisation
which is painstakingly rehearsed. The ideas of the
Brothers Grimm look partly grimmer, partly less grim
on stage than on a printed page. Some people desperate
for the theatre to find a new breakthrough have hailed
the storey theatre as such. But it is not. For years we
have had plays read by actors sitting in front of lecterns,
with some lighting and a minimum of acting. This has
gone out of fashion . (I found it fascinating and wish it
would come back.) The storey-theatre-type of entertainment is now with us. It is disarmingly innocent and nice
for children. Not more.
Place Without Doors by Marguerite Duras who wrote
the scenario for Hiroshima , Mon Amour, is not a Whodunit , but a Whydunit. The Questioner, wonderfully
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simple in his complexity, is acted by Alvin Epstein .
He is the questioning outsider as much as the conscience of a housewife who killed her deaf cousin. He is
also an official psychiatrist making the housewife's husband speak in free association. The play consists of
two long dialogues in which two human beings in their
guilt and innocence reveal themselves. It is a highly
sophisticated play, probing, trying to simplify while
complicating an everyday murder. We are led through
an analysis of facts by the stealthy means of revelation
through deception. The two actors, Mildred Dunnock
and Richard A. Dysart, create three-dimensional figures with their hidden egos as a fourth dimension. The
play has the excitement of a courtroom drama that takes
place within the human soul. The audience is charged
to prosecute, defend and judge.
Everything is talk within this fascinating play. There
is no verbal communication in the folk-rock mime musical Tarot, conceived by The Rubber Duck, nor many
words used in Richard Schechner's Commune, at least
not words of consequence. Both are trying to create
new theatre. The former is an outburst of vulgar dilettantism with nudity and carnal activity, the latter
is a diseased attempt at reviving and topping the deceased Living Theatre. It is the outburst of intellectual
masturbation, creating scenes with the simplistic logic
of crudity, turning everything upside down. All rules
are broken, and the audience is asked to take off its
shoes and tiptoe through the broken pieces. When I
put on my shoes again , my soles were not bleeding,
but my heart was.
I know that Schechner wants to revolutionize the
theatre - whatever that means, and one can forgive him
his artistic blindness. But Jonathan Miller who desecrated Hamlet in his staging with the Oxford and Cambridge Shakespeare Company is another matter. He
did everything to spite convention in creating a new
Hamlet. He started with contrariness while casting the
parts, he had the text spoken as if high school kids would
do a very bad performance of it. His staging mocked
Shakespeare and his audience. Soliloquies were addressed to other players, and one can still take that.
But when the ghost appeared, he sat down on a bench
with Hamlet and talked tQ)J.im as if they sat in a coffeehouse debating the rotten conditions in the state of
Denmark. Shall I go on? I can't. This Hamlet was the
first Hamlet I ever walked out on. I didn't like to be
insulted by Jonathan Miller of whom I know he knows
better.
The Cresset

The Mass Media

Jesus Christ Superstar
------------------------------------------8¥ RICHARD LEE
Nothing can be done to stop the shouting
If every tongue was still the noise would still continue

The rocks and stones themselves would start to sing:
Hosanna Heysanna Sanna Sanna Ho
Sanna Hey Sanna Ho Sanna
Hey JC , JC you're alright by me
Sanna HoSanna Hey Superstar

From generation to generation men have seen Jesus
of Nazareth in the reflections of their own times. It is
no surprize, therefore, that Jesus should be seen as a
rock superstar by some of the younger generation as
they sum up the superstar stage of rock music and begin
to transcend it. The Jesus of Jesus Christ Superstar•
is no more testamentally heterodox than other Jesuses
I have known in and out of the churches, and he is far
more intriguing in his humanity than most of them.
f. C. Superstar is billed as a rock opera, but it is neither thoroughgoing rock nor an opera. It is musically a
studied mix of rock, pop, electronic, folk, blues, symphonic, and English music hall tunes. It is more generically an oratorio - arias, recitatives, and choruses as yet unperformed as an opera on any stage.
Nor has it been celebrated in any sanctuary. No one
need fear that f. C. Superstar is another one of those
"contemporary" services of worship which understandably send him seeking some quiet ceremony to renounce
his baptism. It is musically nothing so denatured, amateurish, or wanting in delight in the creation as most of
those services are, nor is it a liturgy at all. I would not,
however, discount the possibility that remembered
passages of it might help get some younger Christians
through the Lenten services of spiritual flagellation in
too many of our churches and chapels.
When it is rock, f. C. Superstar is mostly the better,
transitional rock of the present day. Not great, but good.
It is always blissfully beyond the bubblegum music of
the typical AM radio station and swish and synchy sound
tracks on TV commercials. It adds not a whit to the decadence of rock and rather impressively formalizes much
that rock explored in the fifties and sixties. It goes most
heavily into folk and soul, and in moments of quiet intensity it furthers the present transformation of much
of rock into more contemplative, elegiac, harmonic and
melodic rock. Indeed, it but briefly returns to the older
rock of apocalypse and nihilism only when the Gospels
call it back. One cannot, after all, cleanse the temple
with a bunny hop or waltz through the damnation of
Judas.
•Jesus Christ Superstar: A Rock Opera. Lyrics by Tim Rice. Music
by Andrew Lloyd Weber. Copyright 1970 by Leeds Music Ltd ., London , England . Distributed in the U. S. A. by Decca Records .
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Many can instantly recall better rock than can be
heard in]. C. Superstar, and so can I. (A part of that judgment may be nostalgia for that socially percussive, necessarily excessive, raw and uncultivated rock of our
happily misspent youths.) But two British lads did brace
themselves musically and lyrically to a theologically
sticky wicket, and the result on my hearing is far closer
to good show than merely muddling through and carrying on.
More discussable here is the libretto. The story joins
Holy Week portions of the Gospels with the rock world
of the recent past and present. Each illumines the other,
sometimes merely cleverly but more often brilliantly.
Jesus is a "three years over thirty" superstar, nearly
as burnt-out as any brilliance of soul must cost a real
man. But he loves his fans wisely to the end by his fierce
independence from them so they can find themselves.
He takes up the cross for his God who is more "keen on
where and how and not so hot on why" and apparently
can only be trusted. Judas is his manager, an opportunist conning for Christ as virtuously as a denominational
executive, and tries manfully to moderate the heavenly
bent of the crowds so they can get some good deeds done
on earth.
Mary Magdalene is Jesus' groupie, a fading flower
child who would do something stupid and holy like
soothing a tired, but restless, Jesus with costly ointments
and a lullaby. Most poignant, given Mary's recently
repented profession, is her blues aria, "I Don't Know
How to Love Him" (later repeated by Judas in chilling
rock). As a single it could slip into the top ten tomorrow
and redeem them overnight.
The Disciples are the very sturdy stuff of humanity,
thick-headed and good-hearted, as comic as any of us
in our wistful incomprehension of greatness. Halfway
into their cups on Maundy Thursday, they sing maudlinly about their deaths on the very verge of the passion.
Always hoped that I'd be an apostle
Knew that I would make if it I tried
Then when we retire we can write the Gospels
So they'll still talk about us when we 've died

Jesus:
The end ...
Is just a littler harder when brought about by friends
For all you care this wine could be my blood
For all you care this bread could be my body
If you would remember me when you eat and drink

The fickle crowds in the choruses seek cheap thrills
now in a hero, now in a scapegoat, and understandably
arouse Jesus judgment, "There's too little of me - Heal
yourselves!" Sinners in masses are shown up for what
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we often are - escapists into the exploits of superstars
of all kinds. The reality of the world's redeeming is the
work of Everyman and not Superman.

The Ephemeral in the Eternal
Coming from his agony in Gethsemane, Jesus is set
upon by the press, eager to exploit another victim for
tabloid voyeurs who need to be shocked by the criminal
element and the sufferings of others in order to go on
believing they are morally alive.
Tell me Christ how you feel tonight?
What would say were your big mistakes?
How do you view your coming trial?
Do you plan to put up a fight?

The establishmentarians are handled with refreshing
gentleness and hence with a better bite. They are not
ogres, only public officials straining by their lights to
shore up the work of God's left hand against His right.
Caiaphas really has the welfare of all of Israel in his
heart set against Jesus (One suspects he knows where the
votes are) and even appeals to Judas' better angels, urging him to take the blood money for his favority charity.
Herod, in a ragtime ditty straight out of Tom Lehrer's
piano bench, betrays his weakness for "radical chic"
and "beautiful people." Andy Warhol assured us in the
yesterday of the superstars that anyone who did anything outrageous enough could be famous for fifteen
minutes, and the jaded tetrarch only wants Jesus to walk
across his swimming pool.
More up to the minute is the newer, more fashionable
"moderate chic" of Pilate. He does not lead, he balances.
He no longer seriously asks Jesus "What is truth?" but
is content to believe "We both have truths." As diagnostic and nurturant as a dean of students, Pilate in one
breath sings "You're a fool Jesus Christ - How can I
help you?" One feels that Pilate would have wished
Jesus institutionalized. But politics is the art of the pos-

sible and public office is the art of discerning trends.
And Pilate has only a cross and a surly majority to bring
to his management of the Jesus crisis.
The brutalization and juridical murder of Jesus is
handled with restraint. The beating of the lash is exploited musically, but without sadism, and the hammering of the spikes and the Seven Last Words are left to
natural sound and voice. The resurrection is not attempted, save by some unsatisfactory musical indirection at
the cross, reminiscent of the Space Odyssey 2001.
The work ends with "John Nineteen Forty-One," a
short, surging symphonic passage which ebbs pastorally
into a great peace. As is the case with most heterodox
Jesuses, no resurrection is really needed for the story.
Were the work more orthodox, it would have been better musically at this point. The rock idiom, with the
right hands on the instruments and the right engineers
on the musicians, could render the resurrection as adequately as any other musical idiom . It would have its
physicality as an edge over all of them.
But this Jesus does die well, and his followers (even
Judas speaking from beyond his own death on his own
tree) do seem liberated from that youthful sentimentality of our times which believes nothing good can happen
in this world. They are left in a silence, as Auden once
put it, which "speaks of some total gain or loss" and
"free to guess from the insulted face just what Appearances He saves by suffering in a public place." In a time
when most heresy is political or ideological, the driving force off. C. Superstar is almost a religious revival.
The late Karl Barth once mused that the angels in
heaven surely play Bach for God, but that God in and
for Himself listens to Mozart. Personally, I own nothing but the mystery of the Trinity. But I wonder whether the Son, having mixed it up with sinners to perfect
their gifts, might enjoy a little rock with the saints now
and then and even present it to his Father.

Music

'1 Hear Muzak and There's No One

There~~

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B Y WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

I hate Muzak. My five-year-old son informs me that
to hate is to wish dead the object of one's hatred. I repeat: I hate Muzak.
To me the most precious moments are the few when I
sit in my house surrounded by a silence so complete
that only the kitchen clock and the back yard birds can
be heard. The Quaker in me hopes at every service when
the pastor says, "Let us pray" that he will let us wait
awhile in silence before addressing ·our petitions to the
listening ear of God. My dentist and doctor think me
overly sensitive when I object to musical assaults not
only in their waiting rooms but even in the inner chambers. Waitresses think me odd to request a table away
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from a loudspeaker. The worst is to overhear a bowdlerized masterwork while in conversation; there it is
too audible to be forgotten yet not present enough to
be heard fully. In such cases I always hope that my sympathetic grunts have the tone of affirmation or negation
appropriate to my unfortunate comrade.
I've always hated Muzak. It was easier when those
disembodied sounds had about them an anonymity befitting their impersonality. But now I know the name of
the man who developed Muzak, and my hatred is confused. It turns out he's a Chicago businessman successful several times over. And what's more, he was a vicepresident of the University of Chicago for some time .
The Cresset

So he's very real and very human. It was easier to hate
the faceless entrepreneur.
In Studs Terkel's anthology Hard Times, William
Benton relates his purchase of Muzak in 1938 when he
recognized its business potential. He put it in restaurants, stores, offices, factories, and wherever his salesmen could convince the proprietor of its merits. Benton
recalls his invention of the slogan used in selling his
product: Music not for listening. He prides himself on
having a tin ear. Most Americans, he says, have a tin
ear, which is why Muzak and radio sold well. His mother was a musician; she wouldn't have canned music in
the house. And one more thing makes it a good product in the salesman's estimation; like tobacco or soap,
it is habit-forming.
When I read this I was grateful to Mr. Benton for his
candor. With an effort I can admire his salesman's skill
while still despising his product: music not to be listened to sold to a tin-eared public. I cannot argue the success of his enterprise. I cannot refute his claim about
American musical perception. In fact the truth of the
latter is borne out by the exam papers from which I
arise to write this column. Even after a semester of remarkable tutelage (well, at least determined) most students fail to perceive anything beyond the most general
of impressions when hearing a piece of music.
Probably for many of them the course has been a
waste of their time; they have ears of high-grade tin.
Because Mr. Benton's assay of his public is so accurate

I am opposed to any cirriculum that requires every student to study music. But there are in the class, I am
sure, several possessing ears of a better composition
whose perceptions have been dulled by the experience
of wall-paper music. At the market, in the office, and
over dinner, they have been trained not to listen for
rhythms, melodies and harmonies, the same elements
out of which are fashioned the great works of musical
art.
The teacher labors to bring these students to the realization that much music is indeed for listening, that
some music requires our undivided attention. A masterpiece is what it is not because of what we do or bring
to it but because of what it gives to those who attend
quietly in humble service. If a student has learned this,
his musical education is well founded and the hard work
of accumulating experience and information is joyful
for student and teacher.
What shall we do then with William Benton? Fortunately for him he has sold the business to parties unknown and escaped our wrath. I can go on hating an
impersonal Muzak for what it does to those American
ears that deserve better, and I will continue the protest
of a minority group bent on listening to music.
Listening is wanting to hear, Mr. Benton, and you've
deprived us of any choice. Give us back a free market;
even a tin-eared American businessman can appreciate
that request.

See-ing
A Needle in a 14th Century Haystack

In May of last year large numbers of soldier-age students on American campuses stopped in their tracks to
consider what Mr. Nixon might mean when he stated,
entering Cambodia, that his administration had no
intention of losing the war in southeast Asia.
At the University of Virginia numerous conversations
sprang up during and after the various mass meetings
and student gatherings. People came out of their customary lairs, carrels, cliques, and protected quarters generally and fell into spontaneous rap sessions out under
the benevolent trees on the Lawn.
I myself fell into several conversations with a law
student, an extremely intelligent and well-read individual who went through the Great Books program at
St. John's College in Annapolis. He was now the active
and very articulate president of the local Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), an organization which often
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characterizes itself as the direct opposite of SDS.
Now, merely to exchange points of view and to debate a bit is not to reach the essence of a man's position.
I found myself growing more puzzled rather than less
so, as we went on talking, beginning with the immediacy
of the Vietnam war and the student "strike" and ranging
into the larger philosophical principles underlying
government and society. Finally I felt compelled to ask
the YAF president for (1) his working definitions of
certain large abstractions that we both seemed to be
throwing around, and (2) some statement of the values
and premises that he was operating from.
It turned out that what he was ultimately seeking was
the "just society" and that a definite conception of this
society was in his mind as he deplored various phenomena around us - angry students, cessation of some classes, petitions to Mr. Fulbright, and so forth.
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He had an extensive and precise description of the
"just society," and I remember exactly the spot we were
standing as he described it - late at night along one of
Thomas Jefferson's serenely lit neoclassic brick colonnades. The "just society" consisted of a body of people
very much like that which centered on the English manor house of the Middle Ages. There was the lord of the
ma~or, wealthy, prosperous, civilized, and absolute.
There were certain overseers (Chaucer describes one,
the reeve, bound for Canterbury), and there were the
tenant farmers and craftsmen, each a master of his own
piece of land or his own useful skill.
The important feature, to my YAF theorist, was the
harmonious relationship between lord and laborer.
The lord exercised a benevolent paternalism, moderate in his demands of labor, free with his bounty to all
those on his estate whose crops suffered or who were
prevented from work by illness, injury, or old age.
The farmers and craftsmen lived lives of security and
happiness in the shade of the great house, fulfilling
themselves by contributing to its wealth and partaking
of its glory in return.
The "just society" here represented has long since
passed, my YAF informant observed sadly. I too had
noticed this, having recently been reading some novels
of Benjamin Disraeli. In the middle of the 19th century
Disraeli was yearning for the enlightened feudalism of
an already-distant past. True, murmured the YAF president, and the only remnants of it today in America are
a few of the larger estates in the South, where certain
vestiges of the manorial spirit still admirably remain .
Once understanding his ideal of the "just society,"
I was able to follow the YAF president's specific objections to the May activities. In his "just society" there is
always order and no interruptions of routine such as
we were enjoying during this pleasant May week. There
is a clear division of duties assented to by all. The lord
receives most of the fruit of the land and gives the orders; the workers receive plenty for simple living and
gladly accept their obligations: obeying the lord, supplying his family with food and service, and enthusiastically helping him pursue his wars and squabbles.
Now the University was quieting down - unfortunately -just as we were thus getting our definitions and

premises clarified. Conversations on the lawn ceased,
and the grass began to groom itself for Commencement
as usual. Summer passed, and in the present academic
year the YAF president is gone.
This is much to my regret, because the point at which
we dropped our discussion is a formidable crossroads.
What he and I have left to debate is an important question of realism. Political thinkers on the YAF end of
the spectrum tend to pride themselves on realism - on
dealing with corrupt and fallen human beings as they
really are, as opposed to holding glittering illusions
about them, as people on the other end of the spectrum
supposedly do (the people zoologized as Wild-eyed
Radicals, Fuzzy-minded Idealists, or Romantic Revolutionaries).
I happen to believe that exactly the opposite is true that the YAF people are the deluded idealists. We all
claim to desire a "just society," no matter where on the
spectrum we fit. But a most definite distinction has to
be made between an ideal "just society" (as wistfully
longed for by the YAF president) and the possible "just
society" (which has to take into account people as they
really are, in our TV- and auto-oriented society, with
their desires and drives planted by the Old Adam and
Madison Avenue).
If we are going to have anything resembling a "just
society" in the Seventies, we should willingly accept
the fact that human beings have demands such as equality, variety, freedom, novelty, and independence, even
though there are many Americans who believe man
should content himself merely with 14th-century order,
hierarchy, tranquility, and security. We cannot escape
the fact that we live in history, and history has made
the former list of desires as legitimate as the latter.
Among the important dates are 1215, 1517, 1776, and 1917.
It is hard to think of anything more wild-eyed and
fuzzy-minded and romantic than fury at people who
don't behave according to feudal standards. Or the
peculiar Buckleyite savagery and sarcasm toward our
own times and our own peoples instead of reasoned
proposals about how the "just society" in America piously asserted in the Pledge of Allegiance - is to be
approximated, given the realities available.

Books of the Month

How Religious Onlooks Make Drafts on the Reality of the World
THE LOGIC OF SELF-INVOLVEMENT.
By Donald Evans. New York : Herder and
Herder. 1970 . $8 .50 .
It has often been suggested by deeply religious people that it is impossible to understand the significance of religious language
without being involved in the life that such
language implies. Because of this seemingly
linguistic oddity many draw the conclusion
that religious commitment is inherently
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fideisti c. subj ectivistic, and arbitrary. Donald
Evans in The Logic of Self-In volvement
attempts to show that this is not necessarily
the case as the self-involving nature of religious language is but one form of a common
aspect of our everyday language. Philosophical and systematic theologians have had difficulty in making clear this aspect of religious
language because their understanding of
logic has been restricted to the investigation

of assertions of fact and relationship between
terms. When the non-propositional language
of religion is forced into such a framework ,
it cannot help but appear odd . meaningless .
or unintelligible.
According to Evans what is needed is a
new logic that indicates how language involves the speaker in something more than
factual statements. The development of such
a logic was begun by 1. L. Austin's analysis

The Cresset

of performative language, that is language
that does not just say something but does
something in the saying. In the first part of
his book Evans makes more precise and expands Austin's analysis of performative language. In the latter half of the book he tries
to show how such a logic helps explain the
self-involving nature of the biblical language
of creation.
Evans' analysis of the performative nature
of language is done with a kind of rigor and
carefulness characteristic of those trained in
the analytical tradition. Critics of this style
of philosophy often claim that it is pedantic
and not worth the trouble of working through
the detailed distinctions . This charge in relation to Evans work would be completely unfounded , for he uses such procedure in an
attempt to reconceptualize some of the dominant issues in contemporary philosophy and
theology . The insights gained about such
problems as the fact-value dichotomy and the
nature of entailment are well worth the hard
reading involved .

If the Language is Relevant, are ...
The main thrust of Evans ' logical investigations is that none of our utterances are free
from performative implications , even though
not all language involves the speaker to the
same extent. Much of our language is made
up of stating, reporting, arguing that something is the case. Such language does no more
that commit us to a belief that what we say
is true . Some of our language however is
more self-involving as it either implies that
we have various attitudes beyond our beliefs
("I apologize") ; or it commits the speaker to
a future pattern of behavior ("I promise").
Much of our language is of these latter types
though it may appear linguistically to be of
the former. The reason for this is that many
of our seemingly descriptive words are often
institutional-relation words that commit us to
a certain status or role ; or the situational context in which the word is used (e.g., a wedding) implies certain commitments.
Once the performative nature of language
is understood it is impossible to assume that
there is some strict separation between " fact"
and "value" in our everyday speech . The
"autonomy of value" slogan is revealed as
but a way of indicating the self-involving nature of our language (56). Moreover we can
now see that many of our important moral
attitudes are subtle combinations of a decision about how something is best understood with a decision on how one should act
toward that something.
The clearest example of this is what Evans
calls an "onlook." An onlook is what we do
when we "look on X as Y"- e.g ., "I look on
Smith as my father." Onlooks involve us in a
decision that certain words are appropriate
to a particular subject matter (126). but the
criterion of appropriateness is nqt that the
two terms of the onlook can be literally compared . What is important about onlooks is
that the attitude appropriate to one of the
terms is appropriate to the other. This does
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not exclude the fact that many onlooks may
contain a strong analogical relation between
the terms (" I look on music as a language. "),
but the absence of such analogical relationships does not invalidate "parabolic" onlooks
where the only relation between the terms is
the appropriateness of the same attitude to
each.
It is important to understand that parabolic
onlooks are not pure fancy or the embodiment
of a pragmatic act "as if" philosophy . It is
not a matter of acting as if Smith were my
father , but acting toward Smith as I would
toward my father. Onlooks are practical and
serious affairs that commit the speaker not
just to a claim that certain realities may be
like this , but they are in fact like this . The
Christian does not say "Act as if God is the
father and certain good results will follow."
Rather he says , "Act like God is the Father
and in so acting you will be making the right
response to what God really is ." ( 133 )
When put in the context of the logic of performatives the biblical understanding of God's
creating activity becomes more intelligible.
Evans uses the best available biblical scholarship to show the Bible is little interested in the
idea of creation as a natural fact , as creation
is seen almost entirely as a matter of God's
historical creation of the people of Israel. In
this sense for the Bible creation is a performative action that occasions a performative response. To acknowledge God as creator involves an acceptance of a status (servant). a
commitment (witness to the nations) , and an
expressive response (worship and awe) . Thus
the doctrine of creation is but one example of
the fact that for the Bible in order to know
God one must participate in a whole way of
life because only the righteous can know God.
In terms of the logic of performatives , to
acknowledge God is to adopt an onlook that
sees God like a human agent that can command , judge, and give. This means that in
order to understand God as the creator we
must become like him - •that is, we must
understand God as creator from the agent's
perspective. For God's new creation , man, is
in the likeness of Himself in that he is able to
share his love. Thus the nature of truth for
the religious man is not being able to substantiate what he knows by some "objective"
means , but by being like what he knows . For
example to know God as He who creates the
world from nothing is to recognize and confess reliance and dependence on his sustaining power.
This short summary hardly does justice to
the complexity of Evans' arguments ; however,
I hope that it at least indicates that this is
one of the most creative and significant books
written in philosophical theology for some
time. This is not only because it gives a descriptive analysis of the logic of religious language, but also because it provides the basis
for assessing the truth claims of religious language once its meaning has become clear.
Evans' analysis of the self-involving character of religious language is not meant as a
subtle apologetic for a religious language

"game" that is somehow not open to truth
claims made in different linguistic contexts .
Rather now that the logic has been clarified a
more rigorous analysis can be made as to
what can count for and against religious
assertions.
In this connection however I would like to
raise a question about Evans' brief hints concerning the truth value of onlooks. He seems
to want to say that certain factual and metaphysical claims can count for or against a
religious man's position . but he never makes
clear exactly how religious onlooks make
drafts on the reality of the world. For example it is questionable if the doctrine of creation can be interpreted as free from claims
about nature as Evans tries to do , for to do so
is to divorce history from its necessary presupposition . In other words it might be the
case that theology has an interest in some language that is not self-involving in the sense
Evans' analysis of religious language entails .
While he seems to want to allow for this he
denies that certain evidence can count for or
against the doctrine of creation since it fails
to carry with it the self-involving nature of
religious language. If this is the case then in
spite of his denial is not the ultimate criterion
of any position pragmatic? Is the final test of
any metaphysical onlook the men produced?

... Christians Relevant to the Languagel
In addition to opening up these kinds of
questions I think that Evans' work will prove
to be particularly helpful for those working
in theological ethics. For it substantiates the
fact that for Christians there cannot be any
ultimate distinction between ethics and belief. It also calls into question the models of
the Christian life that see it primarily as a life
determined in relationship to principles or a
way of responding to situations. Rather the
Christian life is better understood as an ethics
of language. for to be a Christian is to learn
to use and be in accordance with a very definite language. To be a Christian is to learn to
see and conform the self and the world in re- .
lation to the language of the Gospel. So understood perhaps the problem of contemporary
Christianity is not that the language is no
longer relevant, but that Christians are no
longer relevant to the language.
In this respect one must ask however if
Evans has treated sufficiently the ambiguity
of the self-involving nature of religious language. This is not just a question of philosophical psychology concerning our possible
failures to do what we believe and say . Rather
it is a question that concerns the fact that religious language may involve the subject in
mutually contradictory ways . Is the selfinvolving nature of the language of justification consistent with that of sanctification?
It may be that these issues are improperly
raised here because they point beyond the
scope of the book. Mr. Evans is to be thanked .
however. for providing us with a philosophical
analysis of the nature of religious language so
that such questions can be asked in a meanSTANLEY HAUERWAS
ingful way.
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Western Man's Voice is Changing
THE NEW VOICE: RELIGION . LITERATURE , HERMENEUTICS. By Amos N .
Wilder. New York: Herder and Herder,
1969 .
Crane Brinton once remarked that the
splintering motif in post-Reformation Protestantism reflected its essential spiritual vitality .
Another spokesman recently described the
present arts and theology movement as a
great fog bank moving across the American
countryside. Fog and splinter metaphors mix
uncomfortably , even unnaturally. but they
roughly describe the theology and arts picture today . There is a good deal of activity
and that sometimes disorderly activity hints
of life.
Amos Wilder's latest book, for example, is
dedicated to The Society for the Arts , Religion and Contemporary Culture. This group
of sensitive, scholarly, and creative people
has recently sought to give both legitimacy
and direction to the religion and arts field .
Mr. Wilder's book also includes the first Paul
Tillich Memorial Lectures , thus keeping alive
in memory our shared indebtedness to a man
who kept his own responses to his Christian
faith alive by immersing that response in the
arts of the modern world .
Some of the consequences of the interest
of theologians like Tillich and Wilder have
been varying attempts in theological education and , more recently in secular education ,
to cope with interrelationships between religion and the various arts . In theological education . for example, what one sees at present
are centers of emphases. Literature at Chicago. The visual arts and drama at San Francisco. The film and aesthetics at Claremont.
Literature and drama and music at Union .
Christianity and culture at Yale. Drama and
mass media at Christian Theological Seminary in Indianapolis.
Positively , this Christian concern reflects
H . Richard Niebuhr's judgment that Christian institutions and their scholars remain
vital so long as they mediate effectively between the Christian heritage and the contemporary situation . Negatively, the varying
accents reflect the church's uneasy posture
because of its understandable difficulty in
coming up with people, particularly its own
scholars. to respond appropriately to the
faddish and the genuine in the burgeoning
arts world . Actually , individuals like Amos
Wilder have worked in the theology and verbal arts area for a long time now . And this
present book represents. I think , a kind of
"summing up" of Amos Wilder's published
forays in the theology and literature area .
Primarily a New Testament scholar. Amos
Wilder has also gained a deserved reputation
both as a poet and as a critically sympathetic
human being exploring the interesting and
sometimes hazardous shoreline between
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theology and the arts. His first important
work was Poetry and the Chn'stian Tradition (1952). I remember reading the book
with dismay and hope - dismay because the
book confirmed suspicions that a quick glance
at a seminary transcript would reveal a relatively dry desert by comparison with some of
the thirsty excitement one felt in private and
secular universities studying modern literature. I read with hope because Wilder, then at
Chicago, obviously touched some of the vital
pressure points he was to return to with varying strategies in other works.
In his Theology and Modem Literature
( 1958) he provided his readers with a sharper
treatment of Christ and Apollo themes . Deeply attentive to the true vocational "askesis" of
the literary artist, Wilder treated thematically
and polemic;ally some of those modern artists
(William Faulkner and Robinson Jeffers , e.g .)
whose creative work impinged on or elaborated or distorted Christian rehearsals Wilder
himself was most familiar with as a theologian. Then in The Language of the Gospel
{1964) Wilder provided his readers with a
literary and theological breakthrough . Working out of close familiarities with classical
and Christian rhetorical patterns and armed
with his own wide-ranging sensibility , Wilder
showed how language, the shape, structure,
or form of human speech adapted itself to
and was transformed by the Christian gospel. In fact, he teased his readers then by
suggesting that the novel as a genre presupposed a Hebraic-Christian tradition .

The Holism of Hebrew Hermeneutics
The first part of this three-part study dilates on that suggestion . Wilder's premise in
the book derives from his claim that the ultimate struggle for man is the struggle with
chaos and disorder. Language is the tough .
pliable, and expressive symbolic form with
which man seeks to order the chaos of his
world . The Hebrew epos. moreover , in its
combination of realism and holism, "has
served countless generations as a ' house of
being' or cable of order and survival across
the centuries." One question is what pertinent connections are there between the peculiar narrative modes of the Scriptures with
their story movements from first to last
things, their sense of total history. their special concrete historical realism, and contemporary narrative fiction? And more important,
if there are analogous relationships between
past and present rhetorics, what is the significance of those relationships to those of us
who stand a bit uncomfortably with our feet
in both worlds?
Wilder's first working assumption, once
he has placed before the reader his credentials and commitments. is that a study of the
arts of narration carries us from New Testa-

ment to Old Testament, and in the Old Testament to Hebrew anthropology. That anthropology becomes clearer for us when we ponder the ancient forms of Hebrew recital. That
recital , with its subtle variations in form and
theme , has as its especial characteristic
"holism ," which for Wilder means the "scope
of awareness , the multidimensional reality
and realism, the inclusion of private and
public, of the inner life and the social-historical , of somatic and visionary, of ethical
and metaphysical."
In the Hebrew anthropology , responsible
and irresponsible man is man in motion in
history both shaped by his covenental relationship to his creator God and shaping his
future out of that relationship. In addition,
the narrative mode as the Hebrew writers
framed it and as Hebrew memory preserved
it and interpreted it in combining myth , saga ,
and history , presented to man for contemplation the structures of human order against
chaos, of meaningfulness against unreason ,
life against death, being against non-being .
Furthermore, these narrative ground plans
provided for the Hebrew as well as Christian
tradition a total orientation and coherence, a
kind of "map of existence" in space and time
for the human community.
Subsequently, Wilder examines the Biblical epos, comparing and contrasting it with
modes of modern narrative, illustrating how
each seeks to bring man to fuller self-awareness. Using his Biblical materials as literary
norm , Wilder understandably finds even so
great a novelist as Marcel Proust wanting.
But his narrative judgment rests on open
rhetorical and " literary" anthropological insights rather than on closed doctrinal judgments. And the significance of this book rests
on its pointing to that kind of genuinely helpful criticism which copes rhetorically with
theology in literature rather than thematically
with theology and literature issues.
The second and third parts of The New
Voice, although not as stimulating as Wilder's
explorations in rhetoric and hermeneutics
in the first part, build to a discriminating response to the contemporary scene. One senses a falling off of interest perhaps because
the last two sections of the book expand on
questions and problems Wilder and others
have treated elsewhere. We live in a world of
a "confusion of tongues." Western man's
voice is changing. Nevertheless. the artist
and modern cultural change deserve a positive sign because however erring they may
appear to the Christian consciousness , "to
seek is to err." And the pilgrim church with a
necessarily propaedeu tic view of the arts
needs a new speech to move along with its
own expanding consciousness of ever-changing reality.
New rhetorics are in the making. Poets
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reconcile man and technolog-y. Visual artists
paint on principles of indeterminancy.
Healthy improvisation introduces us to the
vitality of colloquial speech. For mortal man
there remains the resonan ce of promised
transcendence. After all . man longs for a homeland . This homeland he still seeks to repossess. The arts , the verbal arts especially .

give us the first Adam in all his secular mystery . Theological meaning or our articles of
belief become pertinent only when we face
this Adam who still yearns for and still needs
salvation.
The strength of Wilder's work rests in his
unwillingness to let the dislocations between
the church and culture lead to an irreparable

break. Nor is he easily sentimental about the
church's response to that culture. For him
biblical past and tumultuous present merge
in the expressive forms men give to their
yearnings. Wilder. in the demanding tradition
of critics like Erich Auerbach. continues to
probe these forms and their significance for
WARREN RUBEL
the reader.

Worth Noting

New Facets of Lawrence in his Letters
THE QUEST FOR RANANIM : D. H .
LAWRENCE'S LETTERS TO S.S. KOTELIANSKY . Edited by George J. Zytaruk.
Montreal : MeGill-Queen 's University Press ,
1970 . $12 .50.
Some individuals have been driven by
inner convictions to strive for a life embodying values which are opposed to an everincreasingly materialistic society. Perhaps in
some aspects Lawrence attained this life, although he never succeeded in establishing it
in a social form. But his life and his writings
leave us with a certain knowledge of the possibility of. and a belief in the need for , devoted
dedication to human life.
Lawrence first met Koteliansky in 1914
during a walking tour in Westmorland and
formulated with him the idea of a Utopian
colony named - after one of Koteliansky's
Hebrew songs - Rananim . Coincidentally .
it was after a walking tour (in Wales ) that
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Robert Southey
first met Thomas Poole in 1794. and together
they were inspired to establish a Pantisocracy. Poole gave a description of the scheme:
Twelve gentlemen of good education and
liberal principals are to embark with
twelve ladies in April next. Previous to
their leaving this country they are to
have as much intercourse as possible. in
order to ascertain each other's dispositions. and firmly to settle every regulation for the government of their future
conduct.
The title of this book may be misleading.
This correspondence contains only brief references to Rananim . and then it is treated as a
life to aspire to. not as the manifestation of
Lawrence's actual life dedicated to attaining
this Utopia. Lawrence maintained a constant
plea for the betterment of mankind and the
world . If he had dropped out and established
his Rananim . it would perhaps have provided
him with the peace. understanding. and love
he so desperately sought; but he did not seem
prepared to renounce the world and the
kaliedoscope of sustained change which the
achievement of his dream would have required him to do . In Ronald W. Clark's Th e

February,l971

Hux/eys, Aldous Huxley reflects upon an
early meeting with Lawrence :
Before tea was over, he asked me if I
would join the colony. and although I
was an intellectually cautious young
man , not at all inclined to enthusiasms,
though Lawrence had startled and embarrassed me with sincerities of a kind to
which my up-bringing had not accustomed me, I answered "yes." Fortunately,
no doubt, the Florida scheme fell through
. . . .It was better that it should have remained , as it always was to remain , a project and a hope. And I knew this even as I
said I would join the. colony.
His relationship with Koteliansky must
have reflected that which would hopefully
exist among the members of the Rananim
community. Koteliansky is revealed as a most
constant friend and aid who was prepared to
take any trouble and make any sacrifice for
Lawrence. When the latter was very ill in
1919 , he writes in Letter No. 153 on March
25th :
The books, the grapefruit and the tea
came this morning. and I was very glad.
Please don 't by(sic) Karaven tea - the
very name sounds beyond words costly ,
like camels and eastern merchandise. I
am ashamed at receiving so much from
you .
Other letters indicate how constantly generous he was to Lawrence, sending him books .
paints, and even a pair of boots on one occasion , in addition to his dedicated help with
publishing problems. (They also collaborated
upon a translation from the Russian of Leo
Shestov's All Things Are Possible .) These
letters . written over a period of sixteen years
(the last was written three weeks before
Lawrence's death). show a profound depth of
feeling for Koteliansky . which may in part
have been possible because of his devotion to
Lawrence. Surely it was also because he appeared to provide no challenges to Lawrence's
philosophies and attitudes. but was prepared
to simply pay homage to genius.
Some tedium arises from the repetitive and

mundane references to day-to-day problems
and financial deprivations as well as from the
revelation of Lawrence's changing attitudes
and fee lings for people. He confides to Koteliansky about his beloved Frieda as early as
March, 1919 (letter No. 151 ):
I am not going to be left to Frieda's tender mercies until I am well again . She
really is a devil - and I feel as if I would
part from her forever - let her go alone
to Germany, while I take another road .
For it is true , I have been bullied by her
long enough. I really could leave her now.
without a pang, I believe. The time
comes, to make an end, one way or another. If this illness hasn 't been a lesson
to her. it has to me.
To witness a man and artist through his
correspondence to one person is necessaril y
less than seeing a mirror of him . This collection perhaps reflects Lawrence's softer aspects and in a way his dependency on Koteliansky. The letters give a delightful impression of the early years from 1914 to 1919 .
when Lawrence seemed at the zenith of his
happiness and his optimism with life - as a
person , if not as a writer - in spite of the
depressions of the war. and the persecutions
he endured because of his poverty and Frieda's
German nationality. Of course he was newly
in love during this period and love was the
thread of Lawrence's personal and artistic
life.
At a time of what seems to be a Lawrencean
renaissance these letters are valuable to the
serious student of Lawrence, especially inasmuch as his relationship with Koteliansky
was unique in its longevity and sincerity . All
detail is not tedium , and new facets of Lawrence are revealed in his intimate everyday
preoccupations:
As I write this in Dares Salaam , Tanzania ,
in 1970 , Ken Russell's brilliant film interpretation of "Women in Love" has just arrived for public showing, only to be banned
before the first performance. Lawrence said
that his books would not be understood for
300 years; perhaps he was not just a pessimist.
SUSAN WILLOCK
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Political Affairs

An Opportunity Well Missed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ByALBERTR.TROST

The situation seemed ripe for intervention by the
United States. Many of the same prospects provoked us
to intervene with an armed force in Guatemala in the
mid-1950's and in the Dominican Republic a decade
later. Certainly with the precedent of intervention in
the domestic affairs of Cambodia only a few months
earlier, one could at least expect, if not overt military
intervention, some dramatic threat or application of
pressure. The announcement of the ending of American
aid or the breaking-off of diplomatic relations would
have been in line with the record of the last twenty years.
From the perspective of mid-October of 1970, it looked as if a "leftward-leaning," pro-Communist regime
would come to power in Chile within a month. The
prospective regime left little doubt about its course,
which included the nationalization of sizable American
investments in copper and nitrates, and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Cuba and
Communistic China. The probable leader of this regime
spoke hopefully of the coming of the second "socialist
revolution" in the hemisphere. The first, Dr: Salvador
Allende reminded us, was in Cuba.
That this provocation of the United States did not
result in interference in the domestic affairs of Chile,
even now, three months after the inauguration of the
regime, is surprising. And one must say, it is hopeful.
It does not become any less surprising or less hopeful
when one realizes that our President does not have a
history of responding to provocations from the left with
such restraint. His counsel and behavior in dealing with
foreign govemments which moved against American
interests while he was Vice-President under Eisenhower
provide a contrast to the present case.
In a conversation with four television reporters before a nation-wide audience on the night of January 4,
1971, the President said:
Now. as far as what happened in Chile is concerned, we can only
say that for the United States to have intervened, intervened in a
free election and to have turned it around , I think would have had
repercussions all over Latin America that would have been far worse
than what has happened in Chile.
And I would say. finally , just as I've told the Chilean Ambassador
when he paid his farewell call on me, I told him to tell the new president that as far as the United States was concerned that we recognized the right of any country to have internal policies and an internal government different from what we might approve of.

Although one may quarrel with the historical accuracy
of a statement or two, applause is the response which
these words should provoke.
Much was at stake in Chile in the last six months, and
the consequences of foreign intervention would have
been much more serious than the effects of our interven26

tion in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, or Cuba.
Unlike these three political systems, the govemmental
institutions in Chile are viewed as legitimate by the
great majority of the population. One of the effects of
this widespread legitimacy is the enviable record Chile
has for political stability. For example, there has not
been a successful intervention by the military in the
country since the early 1930's. Another important effect
of the legitimacy attributed to the Chilean national community and the govemmental institutions is that Chile
is one of those very rare nations in the developing world
that has a multi-party system and free, regular elections.
Included among the parties that contest elections is the
largest Communist Party in South America.
As part of this pattem of legitimacy, regularity, stability, and democracy, Chile had a presidential election on September 4, 1970. Typically, there were three
candidates, one each for the left, center, and right. As
with every election since 1946, none of the candidates
won a clear majority, with Dr. Allende, the candidate
of Popular Unity, the left-wing coalition receiving 36.3%
of the vote. The candidate of the right, Alessandri, was
second with 34.9%. The incumbent centrist party's candidate, the Christian Democrat J!;Ot 28.8%.
Under the terms of the Chilean Constitution, the lack
of a clear majority by any candidate throws the election
into Congress, which is to decide the winner from the
top two vote-getters. Tradition has dictated that the
Congress award the victory to the man with the largest
percentage in the popular vote. Remarkably, even
though the election was so very close and a left-wing
candidate would be president for the first time, the
rules of the game were strictly upheld. The parties of the
left had only 80 seats out of 200 in the Congress, yet Allende was elected president by the Congress by a 153 to
35 vote. The military did not intervene. The incumbent
Christian Democrat, President Eduardo Frei, stepped
down gracefully after the one six-year term to which he
was entitled by the Constitution.
Allende was inaugurated on November 3, 1970, with a
cabinet whose party affiliations closely reflected the
contributions made to Allende's popular victory. In
the 15-man cabinet the Communists got three posts;
the Socialists, Allende's own party, also got three ministries. The Radical Party, the most conservative party
on the left, also got three posts. The remaining seats
in the cabinet went to smaller parties and movements
that supported Allende. Within weeks, President Allende, true to his campaing pledges, was preparing bills
to submit to Congress to nationalize foreign and private
property, carry out land reform, and recognize ComThe Cresset

munist states. It appeared that all of this would be done
in strict accord with the constitutional norms, and with
the support of a majority in the Congress, including
many of the 74 Christian Democrats.
To intervene in these Chilean affairs would not only
be immoral on its face, but would also be counter-productive in that it might destroy one of the most stable
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and democratic of the political commumties in the
developing world. These latter characteristics are goals
which the United States claims to support for other
states, especially those in this hemisphere. For once it
appears that we have passed by the opportunity to intervene in the name of anti-Communism in the hemisphere. It is well that the opportunity was missed.

By JOHN STRIETELMEIEII

Dialogue at Herk's Place

I was sitting on a counter stool at Herk's Place, anticipating delivery of a Herk-a-Burger, which is a doubledecker hamburger with tomato and lettuce salad and a
side order of fries, when this fellow sat down next to
me and gave me a funny look. He wasn't actually wearing a hard hat, but something there was about him that
cried out for a hard hat to complete the picture.
"You a perfesser here?"
I allowed that I was.
"You know this girl that smarted off to the President?"
"You mean Debbie Sweet? Yeah, I know her. She used
to drop by the office now and then and we would talk
about this and that. Incidentally, I wouldn't say that
she smarted off to the President."
"Oh, wouldn't you? Whaddaya call telling the President that you don't think he is sincere?"
"Well, it might be just what the kids mean when they
talk about telling it like it is."
"You mean the President really ain't sincere about
trying to get us out of Vietnam?"
"I don't know. I suppose he is. But do you think he
was sincere when he told us two years ago that he had a
plan for getting us out of Vietnam?"
"I guess he was."
"But we're not out yet. Right?"
"Right. Even so, it don't seem right for a young squirt
like that to insult the President to his face."
"You think she was trying to insult the President?"
"Sure she was. Why else would she have said it?"
"She might have had something on her mind that she
wanted very much to tell the President personally. You
know she doesn't get to talk to the President every day."
"Well, I wouldn't be surprised if the Commies put
her up to it."
"You mean that you can't imagine that a young woman
who sees the lives of her whole generation being loused
up by a war which is probably illegal and certainly
obscene could say something like that on her own without having the Commies put her up to it?"
February, 1971

"Well, why should she get all het up about it? She's a
girl. She's not going to have to go to Vietnam. It's no
skin offa her nose."
"You might be surprised. Her nose may be hurting
her more than you know. We have kids on campus whose
noses are all skiQned up because of the race problem,
and poverty, and pollution, and irrelevant education,
and the war, and a dozen other things. Give them a minute alone with Mr. Nixon and they would make Debbie
Sweet sound like the Republican national committeewoman from Vermont."
"Now that's what gets me. These kids don't have any
respect at all for authority. Dammit, I guess anybody
has a right to disagree with Nixon personally, but the
ought to show some respect for his office."
"I keep hearing this argument about respecting the
office, and I am beginning to wonder whether anybody
remembers that we are a republic. Dick Nixon is no
priest-king whose subjects are expected to stand before
him in speechless awe and reverence. He is the President of the United States, the chief servant of a nation
of free people. We made him what he is and, by God, we
can break him if we aren't satisfied with his performance.
This nonsense about the awful majesty of the presidency
is a pretty recent thing in our history and, if you ask
me, a pretty dangerous thing."
"Why, you're as bad as these kids. No wonder they
act up the way they do when their perfessers talk the
way you talk."
"You mean you think they learn from example?"
"Sure they do. Everybody does."
"In that case, allowing for the fact that they don't come
up to college until they are about eighteen, wouldn't it
seem likely that they have learned more from their parents and neighbors in eighteen years than they are going to learn from us in four years?"
"Aw, you egg-heads are all alike. Bunch of effete
snobs you are. Pass the mustard."
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The Pilgrim
"All the tmm/Jets sounded for him on the other side"
PILGRIJ\I'S PROGRESS

On Teaching Toward a Taxicab
By .JOHN KRETZMANN

Perhaps hope trickles eternal. But it springs only
temporarily, and often in the damndest places. A little
over a decade ago, a number of this country's most active intellectuals, our culture's most insightful pulsetakers, had become despondent. Eisenhower's America
was stagnating, had lost its spirit. Live minds - Paul
Goodman, Norman Mailer, C. Wright Mills and others
- were caught between, on the one hand, what they
perceived as a pervasive and purgatorial robotization
of life among the middle and upper classes; and on the
other, a badly decimated, in fact nearly invisible remnant of a once powerful movement for social justice.
As the culture critics desperately scanned the institutional skyline for signs of life and hope, they rejected
one by one and for obvious reasons, nearly every structure in sight. Business was greedy. Labor lacked vision
and the church had lost its. Government slept.
Finally, only institutions of higher learning remained
on the hopeful list. From colleges and universities glimmered a small light, faint yet but with great potential,
shining through the general institutional murk. The
people in charge at these places were, after all, rational
and humane and liberal in spirit. And there were students - what couldn't the young do once their nascent
idealism was nurtured, their energies harnessed?
How quaint and precious this hope seems in 1971. If
the past decade has taught us nothing else, we should
at least be grateful for its hard lessons on the subject of
higher education. We know now, for instance, that it is
probably easier to separate a brain from a human body,
keeping both in working order, than it is to isolate a
university from the society which it serves. We know
too that we don 't know what education is or should be,
or how learning happens. We suspect that, whatever
education is, most students are at best peripherally
involved in it.
Some critics also recognize that, in fact, the modern
university plays primarily the role of a technically
expert Friday to the omnivorous, conquering Crusoe
which is advanced industrial America. On the side, the
university certifies products, rather like a meat inspector.
Now this catalogue of ills could, one suspects, continue almost indefinitely, and with a great deal more
precision and documentation. Students themselves,
along with blacks and other minorities, social activists
of various stripes and dissident academics have provided
us with worthy critiques aplenty. But what then is one
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to do if he finds himself in academia, sympathizing with
many of the critics yet daily facing students, the classroom, the institution? Following, in outline, is a brief
and incomplete catalogue of suggestions. Some are
practical, some not; some are serious, some whimsical;
some will work, some won't - but most of them, I think ,
might be improvements.
1. Connect. Use every opportunity to expand understanding of, and moral engagement with, the university
as one institution within a much larger systemic matrix.
Plans and programs which bring the university into
tension with other institutions in the "real world" are
imperative.
2. Encourage self-critical reflection. Too often these
days academics argue defensively the half-truth that
the problems "out there" - militarism, racism, and so
on - are the real causes of student rebellion. Accurate
enough, except that the analysis is then used to exonerate colleges from any responsibility which they might
have by virtue of their participation in these evils . It
is clear, in fact, that the academic world reflects accurate! y the policies and practices of the larger society.
Impersonal bureaucratic structures, under-compensated
workers and under-represented minorities represent
conditions which flourish as mightily at 01' Siwash as
within the federal government.
3. Connect again . We've suspected for some time now
that the world does not come in neat disciplinarily defined categories and packages. The sense in which novels are sociology and math is art must be emphasised at
least as much as the particularization of skills which go
into the mastering (of at least the teaching) of those
several disciplines.
4. Enjoy. A Potpourri. Court surprise and failure.
Open classrooms or abolish them. Experiment with
format. Tinker with process, with group learning. Sacrifice a bit of efficiency. Induce ecstasy. Have an epiphany or two. Do meaningful scholarship or none at all.
Discard your briefcase. Concentrate on weak students ,
pushing them as hard as strong ones. Dig into the surrounding community. Play with the bureaucracy . Let
students grade you. Read anti-war poems. Write them .
Listen to rock music occasionally. Live 40-hour days.
Laugh in class.
5. Connect yet again. Students are in fact whole adults
developing a whole stance toward a whole world. So
are teachers. There is no reason not to attempt to deal
with this whole truth.
6. Finally, having attempted all of the above and
more, prepare to be fired. Drive a cab or join a commune. You'll always be a teacher anyway .
The Cressct

